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Abstract 
On 1 June 2017, President Trump announced his intention to withdraw the United States 
(US) from the Paris Agreement on climate change. This paper examines to what extent 
this decision has had an impact on the climate diplomacy of the European Union (EU). 
In light of US disengagement, questions have been raised about the future viability of 
the global climate regime. The paper argues that Trump’s ability to roll back climate 
legislation domestically is relatively restricted, while his impact has been more 
pronounced on the international level. Overall, US disengagement has created a 
leadership gap, which has strengthened the EU’s actorness and provided it with an 
opportunity to increase its external engagement in the field. Even though the EU is still 
in a process of strategic adjustment, three important adaptations can be identified: 
First, the EU has strengthened its cooperation with key partner countries such as China 
and Canada. Second, the EU increasingly frames climate change issues in terms of 
energy cooperation and security in its bilateral relations with the US. Third, the EU’s 
engagement with local and regional actors has been significantly reinforced.  
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Introduction: Kyoto all over again? 
The recently elected President of the United States (US) is standing on a podium in the 
White House Rose Garden, publicly elaborating on his decision to abandon a major 
international treaty on climate change: “For America, complying with those mandates 
would have a negative economic impact, with layoffs of workers and price increases 
for consumers”.1 The Republican President, whose foreign policy has been described 
as ‘unilateralist’ and ‘America First’, thereby ignores the many calls from leaders 
around the world, in particular from Europe, who had urged him to remain engaged 
within the global climate regime.2 The year is 2001, the President is George W. Bush, 
and the treaty that he intends to abandon is called the Kyoto Protocol. 
Almost 16 years later, the United States’ 45th President, Donald J. Trump, is 
standing in the exact same spot while announcing the US’ withdrawal from another 
milestone treaty on climate change – the Paris Agreement. Employing a reasoning 
similar to Bush, Trump emphasises the need to protect American workers and argues 
that compliance with the Paris Agreement would disadvantage the United States vis-
à-vis emerging economies such as China.3 The similarities between the two Presidents’ 
policies on climate change are striking. Domestically, they rolled back existing 
environmental regulations and adopted new legislation to facilitate fossil fuel 
extraction. Internationally, the presidencies of Bush and Trump have marked two 
periods in which the US disengaged from the global climate regime.  
Both presidencies were preceded by a period of US climate leadership. In the 
run-up to and during the negotiations of the Paris Agreement in 2015, the Obama 
administration played a decisive role in the preparation and shaping of the final 
outcome.4 During the 1970s and 1980s, the US was one of the most ardent supporters 
of environmental action and at the forefront of the establishment of a number of 
environmental treaties, such as the Montreal Protocol in 1987.5 However, while US 
leadership had been crucial during the early days of the environmental regime, the 
                                                          
1 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush Discusses Global Climate 
Change, Washington D.C., 11 June 2001. 
2 J. Dumbrell, “Unilateralism and ‘America First’? President George W. Bush’s Foreign Policy”, 
The Political Quarterly, vol. 73, no. 3, 2002, p. 279. 
3 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by President Trump on the Paris 
Climate Accord, Washington D.C., 1 June 2017. 
4 C. Parker, C. Karlsson & M. Hjerpe, “Assessing the European Union’s Global Climate Change 
Leadership: From Copenhagen to the Paris Agreement”, Journal of European Integration, vol. 
39, no. 2, 2017, pp. 248-249.  
5 D. Kelemen & D. Vogel, “Trading Places: The Role of the United States and the European Union 
in International Environmental Politics”, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 43, no. 4, 2010, p. 1. 
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1990s marked the beginning of a paradigm shift in US environmental policy. Under 
President George H.W. Bush, the US had initiated a moratorium on new regulations, 
effectively putting a halt to new environmental legislation.6  
Even though his successor, Bill Clinton, tried to reinvigorate US climate 
leadership, he was unable to gain Congressional support for a majority of his 
initiatives.7 In 1997, the US Senate finally adopted the Byrd-Hagel Resolution with 
unanimous support from both parties, revealing a growing bipartisan reluctance to 
advance climate action. With an eye to the upcoming United Nations (UN) climate 
negotiations in Kyoto later that year, the resolution successfully limited the room for 
manoeuvre of President Clinton, setting out very strict conditions for an agreement to 
gain approval by the Senate.8 This reluctance foreshadowed a gradual US 
disengagement from global climate politics that eventually culminated in the non-
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol.  
In contrast to when President Trump announced his decision to leave the Paris 
Agreement, President George W. Bush's refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol posed a risk 
to the treaty’s very survival. While the Paris Agreement had already been operational 
at the time of Trump's announcement, for the Kyoto Protocol to enter into force, it first 
had to be ratified by at least 55 signatories, representing a minimum of 55 percent of 
overall emissions from industrialised countries. Hence, after the exit of the world’s 
largest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter at the time, the fate of the agreement rested 
with a small group of industrialised countries, amongst them countries such as Russia 
whose commitment to climate action had been ambiguous at best. In this context, 
the EU had to engage in extensive diplomatic activities to ensure that the Kyoto 
Protocol would still see the light of day. In retrospect, the EU has often been praised 
for the instrumental role it played in bringing about the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol.9  
US disengagement from the global climate regime, both in the early 2000s and 
today, caused the emergence of a leadership gap. Due to its self-image as an 
environmental leader and thanks to its economic and political clout, the EU has been 
                                                          
6 Ibid., p. 13. 
7 Ibid., p 14.  
8 G. Kahn, “The Fate of the Kyoto Protocol under the Bush Administration”, Berkeley Journal of 
International Law, vol. 21, no. 3, 2003, p. 550. 
9 S. Oberthür & C. Roche Kelly, “EU Leadership in International Climate Policy: Achievements 
and Challenges”, The International Spectator, vol. 43, no. 3, 2008, pp. 47-48.   
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seen as a ‘natural contender’ to fill this void both then and now.10 However, in the 
early 2000s, EU activism benefitted from a greater urgency to act and a less 
competitive leadership, the former related to the uncertain fate of the Kyoto Protocol 
and the latter referring to the EU's position as the most progressive force for climate 
action at the time. It is important to note that the EU's relative share of GHG emissions 
decreased over time, suggesting that its relative weight in climate negotiations has 
also diminished.  
Against the backdrop of these changes, this paper aims to examine whether 
the EU is still willing and able to assume leadership, when faced with US 
disengagement today. In particular, the following research question is addressed: To 
what extent has the US decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement had an impact 
on EU climate diplomacy? The focus is on the impact of US disengagement on the EU’s 
status as an actor in climate diplomacy (actorness) and its response thereto in terms 
of discourse and actions taken (external engagement).  
The paper argues that US disengagement has strengthened the EU’s actorness 
and external engagement. However, in contrast to the early 2000s, the EU increasingly 
relies on other partners to provide (co-)leadership in global climate politics, reaching 
out to both state and non-state actors. This finding confirms prominent 
conceptualisations of the EU as a ‘networked co-leader’.11 The paper proceeds as 
follows: First, it briefly introduces the reader to the analytical framework, in particular 
to the concepts of EU actorness and external engagement. Hereafter, it examines the 
nature of US disengagement from the global climate regime and the EU’s response 
thereto. The conclusion sums up the main findings and presents a number of policy 
recommendations for the EU’s future engagement in international climate diplomacy.   
 
  
                                                          
10 E. Palacková, “The Race for Climate Leadership in the Era of Trump and Multilevel 
Governance”, European View, vol. 16, no. 2, 2017, p. 253. 
11 D. Belis et al., “Climate Diplomacy and the Rise of ‘Multiple Bilateralism’ between China, India 
and the EU”, Carbon & Climate Law Review, vol. 12, no. 2, 2018, pp. 96-97. 
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Analytical Framework: Measuring EU Actorness and External Engagement 
This study relies on Schunz, Damro and Gstöhl’s analytical framework combining 
actorness and external engagement,12 which builds upon the conceptualisation of EU 
actorness developed by Bretherton and Vogler.13 Bretherton and Vogler distinguish 
between ‘opportunity’, ‘presence’ and ‘capability’ as the three constitutive elements 
of EU actorness: Opportunity relates to the external environment of EU policy-making 
and reveals to what extent structural features of the international setting influence the 
EU’s ability to engage externally.14 According to Schunz et al., the most important 
structural features in this context are interests, institutions, ideas and norms.15  
Interests refer to the “ultimate, material or ideational objectives pursued by 
foreign policy actors”.16 Institutions can be perceived as enduring “patterns of 
behaviour” that structure the international system.17 They can, but do not necessarily 
have to, take the form of multilateral organisations. Finally, ideas and norms relate to 
the subjective worldview of international actors and “standards of acceptable 
behaviour”.18 In climate change diplomacy, the EU’s external engagement has been 
frequently subject to a volatile opportunity. Hence, an examination of the EU’s 
opportunity, gauged along the analytical categories of interests, institutions, ideas and 
norms, appears highly relevant to this paper’s analysis.  
The second component of EU actorness put forward by Bretherton and Vogler 
is presence. The EU’s presence in a given policy field describes its indirect external 
influence as “a consequence of being”.19 Schunz et al. refer to the historical evolution 
of the EU’s legal and policy acquis which “forms the basis of what the EU projects to 
the outside world”.20 Capability constitutes the third and final component of EU 
actorness and denotes the internal context of EU policy-making, most notably those 
features that determine the EU’s “ability to formulate effective policies”.21 According 
                                                          
12 S. Schunz, C. Damro & S. Gstöhl, “Analytical Framework: Understanding and Explaining EU 
External Engagement“, in Chad Damro, Sieglinde Gstöhl & Simon Schunz (eds.), The European 
Union’s Evolving External Engagement: Towards New Sectoral Diplomacies?, Abingdon, 
Routledge, 2017, pp. 15-33. 
13 C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, London, Routledge, 2006, 
p. 13. 
14 Ibid., p. 24. 
15 Schunz, Damro & Gstöhl, op.cit., p. 28-29. 
16 Ibid., p. 16. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Bretherton & Vogler, op.cit., p. 27. 
20 Schunz, Damro & Gstöhl, op.cit., p. 16. 
21 Bretherton & Vogler, op.cit., p. 29. 
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to Schunz et al., the EU’s capability relies “on its legal competence for external action, 
its policy objectives, strategies and procedures for external engagement”.22 
Moreover, Bretherton and Vogler emphasise the importance of vertical (EU vs member 
state level) and horizontal (inter- and intra-institutional) coherence in EU policy-
making.23  
The impact of US disengagement from the global climate regime has a direct 
influence on the EU’s structural context of action, i.e. its opportunity. Moreover, there 
is the potential that US disengagement might indirectly influence the EU’s presence, 
by inducing the adoption of new domestic policies. The latter would be the case, for 
example, if the EU decides to strengthen its own climate legislation to compensate for 
US inactivity. The impact on the EU’s capability, however, seems very limited. Indeed, 
the EU’s capability is mainly determined by the treaties. The EU’s competences and 
internal decision-making procedures are not expected to change as a result of the US 
decision to abandon a multilateral agreement on climate change. Hence, this 
paper’s analysis focuses predominately on the question of coherence, when assessing 
the EU’s capability.  
The concept of actorness in itself can only point to the EU’s ability to engage as 
an actor externally. To assess what kind of actor the EU is and what it actually does, it 
is vital to examine the forms of external engagement that the EU employs in its 
diplomatic activities. The second part of the analytical framework thus focuses on the 
EU’s forms of external engagement. Schunz et al. define external engagement as “any 
form of interaction – whether purposive or […] non-purposive – between the European 
Union and the outside world”.24 It is important to note that this definition not only relates 
to the EU’s engagement with international organisations and states, but also with sub- 
and non-state actors. This is crucial as a large part of this paper deals with the EU’s 
interaction with non-state actors. Based on Schunz et al.’s analytical framework, the 
form of EU external engagement essentially depends on four analytical categories: 
‘objectives’, ‘agency’, ‘mechanisms’ and ‘interlocutors’/’arenas’.25  
Objectives denote the EU’s intentions while engaging in external action. This 
category aims to identify the EU’s external goals in a certain policy field. Agency 
relates to the Union’s internal decision-making and its external representation. It 
                                                          
22 Schunz, Damro & Gstöhl, op.cit., p. 17. 
23 Bretherton & Vogler, op.cit., pp. 29-31. 
24 Schunz, Damro & Gstöhl, op.cit., p. 18.  
25 Ibid., p. 19. 
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addresses the question as to which institution/Member State is in the driving seat 
regarding external action. Mechanisms describe the approach taken by the EU to 
pursue its objectives. Schunz et al. differentiate between coercive, persuasive and 
bargaining-based mechanisms.26 While the former (coercion) relies on hard 
instruments such as sanctions, the latter two follow the logics of socialisation 
(persuasion) and consequentialism (bargaining), respectively. Last but not least, 
‘interlocutor’ aims to identify the target or addressee of EU external engagement, 
while ‘arena’ asks through which venues EU engagement takes place. These venues 
can be diverse, ranging from formal to informal and from multilateral to bilateral 
arenas. Together with the analytical components of the actorness concept, these 
indicators of external engagement serve to structure the analysis of this paper.  
 Based on these conceptual foundations, this paper carries out a qualitative 
case study of US disengagement from the global climate regime under President 
Trump, and in particular its impact on EU climate diplomacy. The time period 
considered ranges from the inauguration of President Trump in January 2017 to 
October 2018. Even though Donald Trump only announced the US withdrawal from 
the Paris Agreement in June 2017, his actions before this decision already had an 
impact on global climate diplomacy. The analysis relies on three different 
components. First, it examines the practical and legal implications of US 
disengagement under Trump. Second, a discourse analysis examines the EU's 
immediate reaction to President Trump’s announcement. In this context, both primary 
and secondary sources are used, in particular press releases, public statements and 
media reports. Third, a process-tracing analysis is carried out to examine the EU's 
reaction and strategic adjustment in practice and over time.  
The relatively scarce academic literature on the topic is complemented by 
primary sources, such as official EU documents requested from the institutions and 
expert interviews. The requested documents concern internal and external 
communication regarding the EU-US Energy Council and the EU-US Working Group on 
Climate Change. They have been partially released and are publicly available on the 
internet.27 They offer valuable insights into the strategic considerations, undertaken at 
the highest level of EU decision-making. Additionally, five semi-structured interviews 
were carried out with EU officials in Brussels. The interviewees were chosen to reflect 
                                                          
26 Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
27 Asktheeu.org, 2018. 
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the key institutions and services involved in the formulation of EU climate diplomacy, 
with a particular focus on the transatlantic relationship.  
 
US Disengagement under President Trump 
The first part of the analysis focuses on President Trump’s domestic and international 
policies in the field of climate change. In particular, it discusses the legal and practical 
implications of his decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. 
 
Impact and Limitations of President Trump’s Policies 
Soon after his inauguration on 20 January 2017, President Trump arranged a number 
of political appointments which already indicated the new administration’s stance on 
climate action. First, the President announced that Scott Pruitt would become the new 
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA is a federal 
agency, responsible for the monitoring and implementation of environmental 
regulation. Mr. Pruitt’s appointment was criticised, as he had been a constant 
opponent of EPA, bringing multiple cases against it as former Attorney General of 
Oklahoma.28 Under Pruitt’s leadership, hundreds of EPA employees have either 
resigned or received buy-outs, resulting in a massive downsizing of the agency’s 
overall workforce.29  
In July 2018, Pruitt finally resigned amidst ethical controversies over his 
management style.30 President Trump subsequently replaced him with Andrew 
Wheeler, a former coal lobbyist, who is said to have “crusaded behind the scenes for 
decades to quash climate change legislation and promote coal”.31 Beyond EPA, the 
Department of Energy was allocated to Rick Perry, who had previously advocated the 
closing of the very same department.32 Ryan Zinke was appointed as the new head 
of the Department of Interior, responsible for the protection of natural resources. Zinke 
is publicly known as a strong supporter of fossil fuel production.33 Additionally, the 
                                                          
28 Bomberg, op.cit., pp. 956-957. 
29 J. Hirschfeld-Davis & M.D. Shear, “Trump Signs Spending Bill, Reversing Veto Threat and 
Avoiding Government Shutdown”, The New York Times, 23 March 2018. 
30 O. Milman & S. Siddiqui, "Scott Pruitt, Trump's embattled EPA chief, resigns amid ethics 
scandals", The Guardian, 6 July 2018.  
31 J. Dlouhy, "New EPA Boss Same as the Old: Pruitt Policies to Stay Intact", Bloomberg, 6 July 
2018. 
32 Bomberg, op.cit., p. 957. 
33 Freeman, op.cit., p. 547. 
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Office of Management and Budget was given to Mick Mulvaney, who considers 
funding for climate action a “waste of money”.34  
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, former CEO of ExxonMobil, surprisingly turned 
out to be one of the strongest proponents of climate action within the administration. 
However, he was ousted and replaced by the climate-sceptic Mike Pompeo in March 
2018.35 Similarly, the relatively climate-friendly national security advisor H.R. McMaster36 
was replaced by John R. Bolton in April 2018. Bolton is a hard-line conservative who 
already served under President George W. Bush as Under Secretary of State and 
Ambassador to the UN.37 
Taken together, these political appointments make it more difficult for 
international partners such as the EU to identify access points within the administration. 
The impact of the new administration’s climate sceptic stance could also be felt on a 
working level. Jonathan Pershing, for example, the last climate envoy under President 
Obama, was first able to keep his position. However, this position was downgraded 
internally within the State Department. According to an official from the European 
External Action Service (EEAS), Pershing no longer reported directly to the Secretary of 
State.38 Eventually, the position of Special Envoy for Climate Change was entirely 
abolished, leading to Pershing's departure.39  
Beyond personnel changes, President Trump also quickly started to issue a 
number of executive orders aimed at rolling back domestic environmental regulation. 
On 28 March 2017, he signed an executive order which obliges government 
departments and agencies to review “existing regulations that potentially burden the 
development or use of domestically produced energy resources”.40 The review 
focuses, in particular, on the promotion of fossil fuels and is supposed to result in the 
suspension, revision or rescinding of regulations which restrict their use. Most 
importantly, however, the executive order is intended to make good on Trump’s 
campaign promise to abolish the Clean Power Plan (CPP). The CPP foresees CO2 
                                                          
34 Bomberg, op.cit., p. 957. 
35 Interview with an official, EEAS, via telephone, 28 March 2018. 
36 Ibid. 
37 J. Dumbrell, “Unilateralism and ‘America First’? President George W. Bush’s Foreign Policy”, 
The Political Quarterly, vol. 73, no. 3, 2002, pp. 280-281. 
38 Interview with an official, US Desk, EEAS, Brussels, 4 April 2018. 
39 N. Toosi, "Tillerson looking to eliminate dozens of special envoy posts", Politico, 28 August 2017.  
40 The White House, Executive Orders, Presidential Executive Order on Promoting Energy 
Independence and Economic Growth, Washington D.C., 28 March 2017. 
EU Diplomacy Paper 4/2018 
12 
reductions in the power sector of up to 30 percent by 2030 (reference: 2005).41 It is 
often seen as Obama’s most important legacy in domestic climate policy and was 
adopted right after the conclusion of the Paris Agreement.  
Officially, Trump has only instructed the EPA to review the CPP. However, the 
agency already announced its intention of rescinding the act.42 In fact, the Trump 
administration already began to reduce incentives for renewables that are foreseen 
by the CPP.43 Nevertheless, repealing, suspending or even revising the CPP is not an 
easy task. Any such effort is subject to a fixed set of procedural requirements.44 
Importantly, agencies and executive departments need to issue prior notice of their 
intentions to repeal a regulation and allow for public comment thereon. Thus, if the 
EPA aims to rescind the CPP, it “will be required to accept and review public 
comment, and once the repeal takes effect it will likely be the target of vigorous 
judicial action”.45  
Furthermore, Trump lifted a moratorium on new coal mining leases and fracking 
on federal lands, while approving two controversial pipeline projects which were 
previously blocked under the Obama administration.46 The Keystone XL pipeline and 
the Dakota Access pipeline projects have been criticised for their “potential impact 
on water resources and the climate, as well as alleged violations of indigenous and 
tribal rights”.47 The approval of these infrastructure projects is not subject to further 
procedural constraints. However, several environmental groups have initiated lawsuits 
against the approval decisions and litigation is currently pending.48 Besides political 
appointments and executive orders, Trump also made an attempt at restructuring the 
federal budget to reflect the change in priorities. 
In March 2017, the Trump administration put forward its budget proposal for the 
fiscal year 2018. The budgets of the Department of Energy, the Department of State 
and the EPA were all supposed to be slashed drastically. The EPA was targeted with 
                                                          
41 Biedenkopf, Katja, “Transatlantic Climate Diplomacy”, American Institute for Contemporary 
German Studies, Washington, D.C., 2016. 
42 M. Mehling & A. Vihma, “‘Mourning for America’ – Donald Trump’s Climate Change Policy”, 
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) Analysis, no. 8, 2017, p. 27. 
43 D. Gordon, D. Reddy & E. Rosenberg, “After Paris: A Climate Agenda that Serves U.S. 
Interests”, Center for a New American Security, Washington D.C., 2017, p. 9. 
44 Freeman, op.cit., p. 559. 
45 Ibid., p. 15. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid., p. 14. 
48 V. Volcovici, “Environmental Groups Sue Trump Administration for Approving Keystone 
Pipeline“, Reuters, 30 March, 2017. 
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the largest proposed cut, a budget reduction of 31.4 percent.49 Moreover, Trump 
proposed to stop, or at least drastically cut, funding for several government 
programmes related to the environment and clean energy.50 However, the final 
Congressional spending bill was perceived as a “broad rebuke to President Trump’s 
vision”.51 Most of his proposals were rejected or even reversed in a bipartisan package 
deal between Democrats and Republicans. While Trump had proposed to cut the 
budget of the Energy Department’s programme on energy efficiency and renewables 
by 69 percent, Congress increased it by 14 percent.52 Moreover, the administration’s 
proposal to shut down the Advanced Research Projects Agency was rejected. 
Instead, the Agency received a budget increase of 16 percent.53 Local environmental 
initiatives were largely kept in place and the budgets of the State Department and 
the EPA have so far remained untouched.  
Despite a Republican majority in both chambers, President Trump suffered a 
major blowback on his budget proposal. Republican lawmakers were primarily 
concerned with the up-coming mid-term elections in November 2018 and were eager 
to protect local interests. The clean energy sector has increasingly become an 
important source of economic growth in many states.54 Hence, it appears logical that 
Senators want to promote these emerging industries in their regions. Additionally, 
Democrats are still able to filibuster in the Senate and to delay the adoption of a 
spending bill, effectively forcing a temporary government shutdown. To avoid such a 
shutdown, President Trump thus also relies on bipartisan support for his budget 
proposals.  
All in all, Trump’s domestic policy agenda signals a willingness to deliver on his 
campaign promises. On the one hand, he improved the infrastructure development 
and extraction opportunities for fossil fuels. On the other hand, his political 
appointments, budget proposals and domestic policy actions reveal a departure from 
existing environmental standards. Taken together, these actions are likely to negatively 
impact the United States' ability to engage in effective climate action domestically 
and internationally. However, Trump’s impact is – for now – not as significant as 
                                                          
49 Mehling & Vihma, op.cit., p. 12. 
50 Ibid. 
51 J. Hirschfeld-Davis, “Spending Plan Passed by Congress Is a Rebuke to Trump. Here’s Why”, 
The New York Times, 22 March 2018.  
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 B. De Botselier, “US Climate Politics in the Trump Era: Options for EU Engagement”, College of 
Europe Policy Brief (CEPOB), 1/2018, College of Europe, Bruges, p. 2. 
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sometimes assumed. Domestic procedural, political and judicial constraints limit the 
powers of the President. The constitutional system of checks and balances curtails 
much of the impact that a Trump administration could potentially have.  
The Announcement to Withdraw from the Paris Agreement – Implications  
On 1 June 2017, Trump officially announced his plan to withdraw the United States 
from the Paris Agreement. 55 While he referred to a re-negotiation of the agreement 
and the opportunity for the US to re-enter under more preferable terms, he also 
announced that the US will immediately “cease all implementation of the non-binding 
Paris Accord”.56 From a legal point of view, President Trump’s announcement has no 
immediate effect. According to Article 28 of the Paris Agreement, the withdrawal 
procedure is only officially launched once a written notification is submitted to the 
Secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). However, under the provisions of the Paris Agreement, this note can only 
be submitted “three years from the date on which this Agreement [the Paris 
Agreement] has entered into force for a party”.57 President Obama enacted the Paris 
Agreement via an executive order on 4 November 2016.58 Hence, the earliest date by 
which the US can launch the withdrawal procedure is 4 November 2019.  
Moreover, according to Article 28, any withdrawal can take effect at the 
earliest one year after the submission of the formal note of intent. As a result, 4 
November 2020 is the earliest date by which a potential US withdrawal can become 
effective. Incidentally, the next US presidential elections are scheduled for 3 
November 2020. This has three major implications. First, US withdrawal from the Paris 
Agreement is not going to be completed before the next elections. Second, the 
United States’ decision to leave the Paris Agreement is likely to be revisited and 
discussed during the next presidential campaign. Finally, it is possible that the US will 
never leave the agreement, depending on the results of the 2020 presidential 
elections. Indeed, a potentially new President would only be able to take office in 
January 2021, hence after the withdrawal were to take effect. However, in case the 
new President-elect was determined to keep the US within the agreement, it would be 
                                                          
55 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by President Trump on the Paris 
Climate Accord, Washington D.C., 1 June 2017. 
56 Ibid. 
57 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Paris Agreement, 2015, p. 25. 
58 Wirth, David, “While Trump Pledged Withdrawal from Paris Agreement on Climate, 
International Law May Provide a Safety Net”, Boston College Law School Faculty Papers, 2017, 
p. 1. 
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politically difficult for the outgoing administration to enact the withdrawal nonetheless. 
Until these developments will unfold, the US remains a party to the Paris Agreement 
and continues to be bound by its obligations.  
In practical terms, President Trump’s announcement has two immediate 
repercussions. On the one hand, the US no longer aims to comply with its 2025 GHG 
reduction target of 26 percent (base year: 2005).59 On the other hand, the Trump 
administration has stopped its payments to the Green Climate Fund (GCF). The 
Obama administration had previously committed 3 billion USD in financial support to 
the GCF, of which 1 billion USD were already provided.60 The remaining 2 billion USD, 
representing almost 20 percent of the Fund’s overall capacity (10.3 billion USD), will no 
longer be paid. Many observers were also left wondering in what capacity the US 
would be represented at future UN climate negotiations.  
The 23rd Conference of the Parties (COP-23) that took place in Bonn in 
November 2017 was the first climate summit after President Trump’s announcement 
and served as a test ground to examine the US role in future climate negotiations.61 
Importantly, the US sent a delegation to Bonn, which signals its intention to continue to 
participate in the negotiations. Comparing the provisional participant lists of COP-22 
(Obama administration) and COP-23 (Trump administration), one can determine that 
the total number of official US delegates almost halved from 91 to 48.62 This drop in 
numbers reflects a clear change in the administration's priorities. However, in the eyes 
of a conference participant, the US delegation comprised many familiar faces and 
largely continued to advocate its usual positions.63 
In Bonn, developing countries were vocal on a stronger differentiation in the 
Paris rulebook and rejected the set-up of an ambitious transparency mechanism.64 US 
leadership on these issues has suffered from a lack of credibility according to an official 
from the EEAS.65 The lack of credibility is particularly pronounced with regard to the 
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issue of financing, as the US has significantly cut its contributions to the GCF. This has a 
negative impact on the extent to which the European Union can rely on US support 
during UNFCCC negotiations.66 
Another important feature of the Bonn climate summit was the presence of a 
second, unofficial delegation from the US. This delegation, the so-called ‘We-Are-Still-
In’ coalition, comprised several representatives from states, cities, and the business 
community, representing half of US gross domestic product.67 In Bonn, they “opened 
an impossible-to-miss, 27,999-square foot ‘U.S. Climate Action Pavilion’ outside the 
main COP 23 venue”.68 Moreover, they presented the report ‘America’s Pledge’, in 
which they promise to make additional efforts to ensure that the US would meet its 
targets under the Paris Agreement.69 
There is a long-standing tradition of local and state action on climate change 
in the United States.70 In fact, state legislators have time and again outperformed the 
federal government, as they enjoy considerable competences in environmental 
matters.71 The state of California serves as a case in point. California has led the way 
in domestic climate action, by pioneering both vehicles’ emission standards and an 
emissions trading scheme (ETS). The introduction of the latter came as a reaction to 
President Bush’s decision to not ratify the Kyoto Protocol in the early 2000s. In response 
to Trump, California engaged in extensive diplomatic activities both at home and 
abroad and announced that it will work to cut emissions by 50 percent until 2030.72  
Whereas President Bush’s rejection of the Kyoto Protocol had been welcomed 
by a substantial part of the business community, the private sector’s reaction to 
Trump’s announcement in 2017 was overwhelmingly negative.73 Rather than adapting 
their business strategies, enterprises continue to invest in innovation and clean energy 
technology.74 This change can largely be attributed to the economic maturity that 
                                                          
66 R. Keohane, “The International Climate Regime without American Leadership”, Chinese 
Journal of Population Resources and Environment, vol. 15, no. 3, 2017, p. 185. 
67 Winkler & Depledge, op. cit., pp. 143-144. 
68 S. Leahy, “Half of U.S. Spending Power Behind Paris Climate Agreement”, National 
Geographic, 15 November 2017. 
69 “America’s Pledge”, Bloomberg Philanthropies, 2017, pp. 9-11. 
70 L. Kemp, “US-proofing the Paris Climate Agreement”, Climate Policy, vol. 17, no. 1, 2017, p. 
89. 
71 Gordon, Reddy & Rosenberg, op.cit., p. 8. 
72 Leahy, op.cit. 
73 M. Betsill, “Trump’s Paris Withdrawal and the Reconfiguration of Global Climate Change 
Governance”, Chinese Journal of Population Resources and Environment, vol. 15, no. 3, 2017, 
p. 190. 
74 Bomberg, op.cit., p. 959. 
Valentin Steinhauer 
17 
clean technologies have reached over the past two decades. The long-term trend 
towards green energy appears largely irreversible. Hence, US emissions are likely to fall 
over the next decade, regardless of Trump’s policies. A report from the Rhodium Group 
estimates that, in the absence of new policies, US emissions will fall by 15 to 19 percent 
by 2025, which is, however, still roughly ten percent below the target of its Nationally 
Determined Contribution (NDC).75 
 
The EU’s Reaction to US Disengagement  
From a geopolitical point of view, Trump’s decision to leave the Paris Agreement has 
created a leadership gap in climate change diplomacy. The EU has been referred to 
as a ‘natural contender’ to fill this void.76 The next section examines to what extent the 
EU has been able and willing to provide leadership in light of US disengagement, 
paying particular attention to the concepts of actorness and external engagement. 
 
The EU’s Immediate Reaction to Trump’s Announcement 
The EU’s first official response to Trump’s announcement was issued only a couple of 
hours after the US President had given his speech. In a press statement, the 
Commissioner for Climate Action, Miguel Arias Cañete, called Trump’s announcement 
a regrettable “unilateral decision”.77 Interestingly, Cañete recalled the non-
prescriptive character of the Paris Agreement and stressed that “there is room for the 
US to chart its own course within the Paris Agreement”.78 This formulation points to the 
fact that the Commissioner did not consider Trump's decision to be irreversible. The 
Commissioner further announced that the EU remained committed to a ‘leadership’ 
role on climate action and that it would “strengthen its existing partnerships and seek 
new alliances”.79  
The reference to ‘new alliances’ does already hint at a strategic re-orientation 
in response to US disengagement. Commissioner Cañete specifically pointed to “US 
businesses, citizens and communities”, which he expects to form an integral part of 
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any future partnership.80 The European Parliament’s President Tajani reminded the US 
that “the Paris Agreement must be respected”.81 Environment Committee Chair 
Adina-Ioana Vălean added that she hoped that “America will, in the end, come back 
on our side in the fight against climate change”.82 Hence, similar to Commissioner 
Cañete’s reaction, Vălean considered that the final word on the future participation 
of the US under the Paris Agreement had not yet been spoken. Moreover, she called 
for EU leadership and emphasised cooperation with China and the High Ambition 
Coalition, an alliance between small, ambitious developing countries and the EU, 
which was instrumental in pushing for an ambitious outcome at the Paris climate 
conference. The diversity of political groups within the European Parliament, however, 
is also reflected in a diversity of viewpoints. This was evident at the plenary session on 
14 June 2017, when several Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from the 
‘Europe of Nations and Freedom’ group applauded Trump’s decision.83 
The European Council and the Council of Ministers did not release a dedicated 
press statement in the immediate aftermath of Donald Trump’s decision. Only at the 
next Council meeting on 19 June 2017, EU Member States finally adopted a joint 
response.84 They reconfirmed their commitment to the Paris Agreement and clearly 
rejected President Trump’s call for a renegotiation of the accord. Moreover, they 
emphasised that “the world can continue to count on the EU for leadership in the 
global fight against climate change”.85 The language of the Council conclusions 
resembles to a large degree to the one used by Commissioner Cañete in his statement 
of 1 June 2017, in particular the call for a reinforced engagement with new partners, 
especially non-state actors.  
After the adoption of a common position at ministerial level, the EU’s heads of 
state followed suit by adopting European Council conclusions on 22 June 2017.86 In 
terms of content, the two documents are barely distinguishable. Apart from their 
engagement within the EU, some Member States have also sought to coordinate their 
                                                          
80 Ibid. 
81 European Parliament, EP President Tajani: ‘The Paris agreement is alive and we will take it 
forward’, Press Release, Brussels, 1 June 2017. 
82 Ibid. 
83 European Parliament, European Parliament Debate on U.S. Withdrawal from Paris Climate 
Agreement, video, 2 June 2016. 
84 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Climate Change following the United 
States Administration’s Decision to Withdraw from the Paris Agreement, Brussels, 19 June 2017.  
85 Ibid. 
86 European Council, European Council Conclusions on the Paris Agreement on Climate 
Change, Brussels, 22 June 2017. 
Valentin Steinhauer 
19 
response to Trump’s announcement outside of the EU institutions. The heads of state 
of Germany, France and Italy released a joint statement on the day of Trump’s 
announcement, expressing their continued commitment to the Paris Agreement.87 In 
the absence of an immediate response by all 28 Member States, media attention was 
clearly focused on the response of these three countries.88  
The most memorable European response to Trump, however, was delivered by 
the French President. In a televised broadcast, Emmanuel Macron playfully 
transformed Trump’s campaign slogan into the catchphrase ‘make our planet great 
again’.89 It is perhaps telling that Commission President Juncker simply recited these 
words when he talked about climate change in his State of the Union Address in 
September 2017.90 Thanks to a smart online communication strategy and the fact that 
Macron delivered his speech in English and French, he managed to spread his 
message around the globe and successfully presented himself and his country as 
climate champions.   
All in all, the EU’s response to Donald Trump was coherent in terms of the 
message that was conveyed. EU leaders clearly confirmed their commitment to the 
Paris Agreement and signalled their intent to pursue leadership, for example by 
reaching out to new partners (i.e. non-state actors). However, when it comes to the 
delivery of the message, there was a lack of internal coordination. EU Member States 
needed almost two weeks to adopt a common position. In the era of online media, 
this is late. It was therefore the reaction of a small group of large Member States that 
stuck out in the immediate aftermath of Donald Trump’s announcement.   
 
EU External Engagement with non-US Actors 
Already before Donald Trump’s announcement, the EU had internally started to 
prepare for the eventuality of US withdrawal. Indeed, the EU and China began to work 
on a joint statement on climate change immediately after Trump’s election.91 An 
official from the EEAS, who was present at the COP-22 negotiations, confirmed that 
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the decision to prepare a joint statement was already taken during the climate summit 
in Morocco, which took place in parallel to the US elections.92 After months of careful 
preparations, the draft statement received the support of all EU Member States and 
was ready to be adopted at the 19th EU-China summit on 2 June 2017.93  
The draft joint statement was leaked to the press a couple of days before the 
summit.94 The document includes a strong statement from both parties in support of 
the Paris Agreement and a promise to “step up their co-operation to enhance its 
implementation”.95 In particular, the two parties present a number of concrete 
proposals to strengthen Sino-European cooperation on a bilateral level. Prominent 
examples include the set-up of a nation-wide emissions trading scheme in China or 
the development of low-carbon mobility systems. Due to trade-related issues, 
however, the EU and China were unable to agree on a joint statement in 2017, so that 
the document was only adopted at the 20th EU-China summit in July 2018.  
The EU also reached out to other key partners in the wake of Donald Trump’s 
announcement. Together with the African Union, the Commission published a short 
statement on 1 June 2017, reaffirming their joint commitment to the implementation 
of the Paris Agreement.96 On 14 June 2017, the European Parliament invited the 
President of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, who holds the chair of the High 
Ambition Coalition, to speak in front of the plenary on the issue of US withdrawal. 
Moreover, in the context of the G20 meeting in Hamburg in July 2017, EU leaders 
played an important role in the adoption of a statement by the heads of state and 
government in support of the Paris Agreement.97  
The EU also engaged in further outreach activities. On 16 September 2017, the 
EU together with Canada and China hosted the first ‘Ministerial on Climate Action’ 
(MoCA) in Montreal. According to an official from DG CLIMA, the creation of the 
MoCA is directly related to US disengagement from the global climate regime.98 Under 
Obama, the US used to convene the ‘Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate 
Change’. This forum allowed for a high-level exchange on climate and energy 
between major developed and developing economies. However, under Trump this 
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format was abandoned.99 Hence, the MoCA is intended to replace the Major 
Economies Forum, by providing a new framework to continue these discussions.  
Ministers from over 30 major economies followed the invitation to the first MoCA. 
Even though the US participated, it was the only country that was not represented at 
ministerial level. Moreover, instead of sending a representative from the State 
Department, which represents the US in climate talks, the Trump administration sent 
the deputy director of the US National Economic Council.100 The discussions at the 
MoCA essentially served as preparatory talks ahead of the 2017 climate summit in 
Bonn and helped to streamline the work on the Paris rulebook. Moreover, the parties 
agreed to reconvene for a second MoCA, which took place in Brussels, in June 2018.101 
It was hosted by the EU and “designed to help ensure the success of the 24th UN 
Climate Change Conference this year in Katowice, Poland”.102 The high-level nature 
of these meetings allows the EU, China and Canada to streamline their efforts and to 
push jointly for a successful outcome at UN climate conferences. In this way, the MoCA 
should be seen as a complementary tool that is used to facilitate negotiations at the 
UN level.  
 
EU External Engagement with US Actors  
While the EU has intensified its efforts at reaching out to key partners beyond the US, it 
also continues to seek engagement with US actors. On the multilateral level, the EU 
aims to keep up the cooperation at climate summits. At COP-23, it continued to 
consult with the US delegation.103 The US still co-chairs the working group on 
transparency together with China. Hence, even though the US participation in the 
negotiations has decreased in both quantity and quality, the country is still involved in 
the process. Transatlantic coordination continues especially on reporting, 
differentiation and transparency issues. However, the US no longer plays a leadership 
role in the negotiations, due to both a lack of interest and credibility.104  
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 On the bilateral level, the EU also remains interested in addressing climate 
change issues in its interactions with the US. Under Obama, the two parties had 
created the EU-US Energy Council in 2009.105 This Council allows for high-level 
exchanges on climate change issues and is usually attended by the Secretaries of 
State and Energy on the US side and the Commissioners for Energy and Climate as well 
as the High Representative on the EU side. In 2016, the two parties decided to further 
strengthen their bilateral relations under the EU-US Energy Council, by setting up a 
dedicated Climate Change Working Group. The Working Group met for the first time 
on 22 September 2016.106 Since Trump’s inauguration there has been no meeting of 
the Climate Change Working Group,107 and only recently another meeting of the EU-
US Energy Council. 
 An examination of internal and external communication material, provided by 
the EU institutions, reveals that the EU had tried to revitalise these fora on multiple 
occasions. On 22 February 2017, for example, in a letter personally addressed to the 
then US Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, High Representative Frederica Mogherini 
specifically mentioned the EU-US Energy Council as a “vital forum for transatlantic 
cooperation”.108 She also suggested convening the Energy Council “at a mutually 
convenient time during 2017”.109 This invitation was later re-stated in several follow-up 
letters written by Mogherini as well as Commissioners Šefčovič and Cañete.110 
Moreover, the letters were drafted in a way that, albeit mentioning clean energy, 
climate and the environment, the focus was clearly placed on aspects of energy 
security and economic growth.111 This confirms the assessment of a high-level official 
from the EEAS, who stated that the EU started to increasingly engage the US on climate 
issues through the framework of energy cooperation and security.112  
As direct cooperation on climate change is assumed to be a ‘red flag’ for the 
Trump administration, there have not been any attempts at revitalising the working 
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group on climate change.113 This points to a strategic adjustment of the EU’s 
engagement with the US. Even though transatlantic cooperation on climate change 
has always been closely related to energy, it is fair to assert that the ‘energy-climate 
nexus’ has become an even more important tool, at least from the EU's point of view, 
to address climate issues under Trump. Apart from its efforts to frame climate issues in 
terms of clean energy and energy efficiency, the EU has also increasingly tried to 
address the ‘climate-security nexus’ through formats such as the G7 and G20, or the 
UN Security Council.114   
Another change is the reinforced focus on US regional and local actors. The EU 
is actively engaging with these actors, most notably through the ‘Global Covenant of 
Mayors for Climate and Energy’. This Global Covenant was created in 2016 and 
represents a forum for cooperation between local and city actors on climate and 
energy-related issues.115 It comprises thousands of non-state actors from around the 
world and is currently co-chaired by Commission Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič and 
former New York Mayor and UN Special Envoy for Cities and Climate Change Michael 
Bloomberg.116 The value of this platform is its non-state focus, according to a 
Commission official.117 The Commission has increasingly strengthened its engagement 
in the steering process of the Covenant.  
The importance of the Commission’s input has been recently underlined by the 
opening of the Global Covenant’s new headquarters in walking distance to the 
Berlaymont building in Brussels.118 The EU’s engagement is, however, not limited to city 
actors. Climate Commissioner Cañete, for example, received California’s Governor 
Brown in Brussels to discuss possibilities of linking carbon markets and cooperation on 
low-carbon transport.119 In return, Cañete visited the 2018 Global Climate Action 
Summit, which brought together local and regional actors in San Francisco, California. 
The European Parliament has also reached out to non-state actors. At COP-23, MEPs 
met with representatives of the ‘We-Are-Still-In’ initiative to discuss options to 
strengthen their participation in the UN climate regime.120 Moreover, the European 
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Parliament has made use of the ‘Transatlantic Legislative Dialogue’ to initiate an 
exchange on climate change with members of Congress. As a result, at the meeting 
in December 2017, common ground could be found in particular on the importance 
of the cooperation on energy security and energy diversity.121  
The EU Delegation in Washington also plays a crucial role in engaging with local 
and regional actors in the US. It developed an action plan on climate change 
outreach, specifically targeted at local and regional actors.122 This engagement 
strategy foresees, inter alia, an increased participation in conferences and meetings 
with a focus on local climate action.123 In December 2017, the EU Ambassador to the 
US participated in the North American Climate Summit in Chicago, which brought 
together non-state actors from across the country.124 Officials from the EEAS in Brussels 
also visited Chicago and had meetings with key stakeholders.125 Importantly, the 
insights gained on the ground are regularly reported back to the EEAS headquarters 
and fed into the EU’s policy processes.126  
It is a bit early to tell whether US disengagement under President Trump will have 
a similar effect on the EU’s presence as was the case under Bush. In the early 2000s, 
major domestic policies (e.g. EU ETS) were launched at a time when the survival of the 
Kyoto Protocol was still unsure. While the adoption of these policies was motivated by 
a plethora of reasons, they also served to signal ‘leadership-by-example’. Today, a 
similar development can be observed. Indeed, the EU is adopting new policies 
primarily with the aim to comply with its commitments taken under the Paris 
Agreement. These commitments are based on the EU’s NDC, which so far has not 
been adjusted since Trump came to power.  
However, the 2020 stocktaking exercise will offer an opportunity for the EU to 
express leadership by adopting more ambitious reduction targets. Recently, the EU 
has signalled its willingness to do exactly that. On the fringes of the second MoCA in 
Brussels, Climate Commissioner Cañete announced that the EU may be set to increase 
its GHG emission reduction targets from 40% by 2030 to 45%.127 The planned adjustment 
comes as a result of a series of institutional negotiations on clean energy targets, 
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producing more ambitious outcomes than previously foreseen by the Commission. 
Even more recently, the European Parliament and the Council adopted their positions 
regarding the Commission proposal on CO2 emissions of passenger cars for the post-
2020 period. Again, both institutions exceeded the targets proposed by the 
Commission, pointing to a general trend amongst the co-legislators in favour of more 
ambitious climate action.128 
Even though it is difficult to establish a direct causal link between US 
disengagement and the observed appetite for enhanced climate action amongst EU 
decision-makers, this paper argues that a partial correlation cannot be denied. The 
Eurobarometer regularly shows that climate change ranks amongst the top priorities 
that EU citizens want the EU to work on.129 In light of the upcoming European 
Parliament elections and an increasingly Eurosceptic citizenry at home, both the 
European Parliament and the Council have an interest in presenting themselves as 
champions of the climate cause. US disengagement therefore creates a ‘window of 
opportunity’ for the EU to prove its own relevance by enhancing its internal climate 
policy. Consequently, the EU's presence in the field of climate change is in the process 
of being strengthened, also because US disengagement has increased a sense of 
urgency to do more.  
 The effect of US disengagement on the EU’s opportunity was even more 
pronounced. Just like the non-ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, Trump’s decision to 
withdraw the US from the Paris Agreement resulted in a weakening of the global 
climate regime. The impact of his decision in terms of leadership, funding, expertise 
and credibility is considerable. On a normative/ideational level, Trump has also 
questioned the science of climate change. His stance on global warming and science 
in general has been interpreted as an attack on the very idea of evidence-based 
policy-making. In fact, some observers have even spoken of the emergence of an 
age of ‘post-truth’ politics.130 Trump’s announcement has especially created a void in 
terms of leadership. The EU is one of the potential candidates to fill this void, but so are 
others such as China, India or Canada. When the US decided to pull out of the Kyoto 
Protocol, the EU was considered to be the only viable alternative for leadership. In an 
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era of fragmented leadership, the EU’s opportunity continues to be conducive to 
external engagement, but has been subject to a higher degree of competition. 
The EU’s capability in climate diplomacy has not been substantially altered 
since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. However, in terms of coherence, two 
observations can be made. On the one hand, the EU’s communication strategy after 
President Trump’s announcement appeared at times uncoordinated. Even though EU 
leaders largely expressed the same message, the lack of a single, forceful and 
immediate response from all EU Member States damaged internal coherence. On the 
other hand, the EU’s engagement in terms of action was much better coordinated. 
Whereas the EU’s multi-level governance harmed the delivery of a single message, the 
EU’s diplomatic activities benefitted from its multilevel engagement. Member States 
and EU institutions successfully complemented each other in their diplomatic efforts to 
keep up the Paris momentum.  
Taking presence, opportunity and capability together, this paper thus argues 
that the EU's actorness has been strengthened as a result of US disengagement under 
Trump. This strengthening is most pronounced when it comes to opportunity and 
presence. The paper also identified three important adaptations concerning the form 
of EU external engagement. First, the EU has strengthened its cooperation with key 
partner countries such as China and Canada. Second, it has increasingly framed 
climate change issues in terms of energy cooperation and security in its bilateral 
relations with the US. Third, the EU’s engagement with local and regional actors has 
been significantly reinforced. Rather than claiming that EU engagement with non- and 
sub-state actors is the result of US disengagement, this paper argues that the Trump 
administration’s policies reinforced the importance attached to already existing 
relations with non-state actors.  
Hence, the EU’s external engagement has intensified and was most clearly 
shaped by the interlocutors’ and arenas. The EU’s focus on key partners such as China 
and Canada as well as local and regional actors is not new, but more resources have 
been invested in these relations. Moreover, existing venues such as the Global 
Covenant have received increasing attention and new formats such as the MoCA 
have been created in response to US disengagement. The EU’s objectives in 
international climate diplomacy have remained largely the same. The EU continues to 
advocate for transparency and a strong review mechanism, while defending an 
equal application of the rules to all parties.  
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The EU also continues to reach out to the US. However, the mechanisms that 
are used for engagement have been adjusted significantly. The EU increasingly aims 
at framing climate issues in terms of energy and security, strategically adapting itself 
to the Trump administration’s priorities. Its (successful) attempts to revitalise the EU-US 
Energy Council stand witness to this approach. Moreover, specific engagement 
strategies have been implemented within the EEAS, most notably through the EU 
Delegation to the US. These strategies focus on outreach activities targeted at local 
and regional actors as well as civil society. The European Parliament recently adopted 
a report calling on all EU Delegations to develop a climate action plan and engage 
in consistent climate diplomacy, not only in the US but across the globe.131 
In contrast to these persuasive ‘mechanisms’, Trade Commissioner Malmström 
has also announced to conclude future free trade deals exclusively with those 
countries that have ratified the Paris Agreement.132 Even though discussions on a trade 
deal with the US have been frozen since 2016, these may well become relevant again 
in the future, not least as a potential solution to the current conflict on import tariffs. 
Hence, this move can be seen as an attempt to complement the EU’s persuasive 
approach with a greater focus on coercive, or at least bargaining-based instruments. 
Finally, the continuous search for new policy tools show that the EU is still in a process 
of strategic adjustment.  
 
Conclusion: What comes next? 
This paper has explored to what extent the US decision to withdraw from the Paris 
Agreement had an impact on EU climate diplomacy. The findings have revealed that 
US disengagement has strengthened EU actorness and external engagement. 
Moreover, it was shown that US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement requires a 
lengthy and formal procedure that can only be completed after the next presidential 
elections in November 2020. Even though President Trump’s decision to immediately 
cease the implementation of the Paris Agreement has important practical 
repercussions, the US constitutional system of checks and balances as well as regional, 
local and civil society engagement have so far limited the effect of President Trump’s 
policies. Nonetheless, the impact of US disengagement on the global climate regime 
in terms of leadership, funding, expertise and credibility is considerable. 
                                                          
131 Morgan, op.cit. 
132 M. Dupré & S. Leré, “Trade and Climate: How the EU Can Protect the Paris Agreement”, 
EURACTIV, 28 February 2018.   
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 In this context, the EU is once again identified as a ‘natural contender’ for 
leadership. However, in an era of fragmented leadership, the EU can no longer 
provide such leadership on its own. Instead, it increasingly shares this role with other 
key players. The list of partners that the EU has reached out to in the wake of President 
Trump's inauguration is diverse and ranges from the African Union to US Governors and 
non-state actors. In the future, the EU could explore further options for a stronger 
engagement of sub- and non-state actors within the UN climate regime. In particular, 
their participation in the negotiations at climate summits could be strengthened. Non-
state actors are an important source and channel for climate funding. It would be 
possible, for example, to look into opportunities to allow for a greater participation of 
the private sector in the GCF.  
Additionally, the EU’s clout as a trade power could be an effective bargaining 
chip. So far, the EU’s reaction to US disengagement under President Trump has mostly 
relied on persuasion. Recently, Commissioner Malmström has started a discussion on 
linking ratification of the Paris Agreement to the conclusion of future trade deals. 
Although it is doubtful that such a move would influence Trump’s position, the climate-
trade nexus provides a plethora of opportunities for engagement that could provide 
additional leverage. One potential tool would be to revitalise the negotiations on the 
Environmental Goods Agreement. The EU and the US have a joint interest in the 
facilitation of trade of ‘green goods’. Such an agreement has the potential to make 
clean technology more affordable and to encourage competition. Negotiations 
came to a halt in late 2016, mainly due to technical issues.  
In December 2018, the 24th Conference of the Parties will take place in 
Katowice. The conference will primarily focus on the finalisation of the Paris rulebook, 
but talks will also touch on the question of enhanced ambitions. Already now, it is clear 
that higher ambitions are needed to keep global warming below two degrees Celsius. 
Recent developments suggest that the EU may adapt its NDC to reflect an increase 
in its emission reduction target from 40 to 45 percent by 2030. This in itself will not be 
enough. It will be vital for the environmental effectiveness of the Paris Agreement that 
the emerging economies, in particular China, will raise their ambitions as well. The 
socio-economic turbulences that some emerging economies have been facing 
recently, in particular with regard to trade, might also prove to be barriers on the way 
towards enhanced action. 
The emerging alliance between the EU, China and Canada might prove crucial 
in setting the pace at COP 24. In the absence of US leadership, this format will receive 
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more attention. Ahead of the upcoming European Parliament elections next year, the 
EU institutions appear united in their support for more climate action. However, much 
will depend on the Member States. With Poland holding the COP Presidency and 
Romania taking over the EU Council Presidency, two rather climate-sceptic countries 
are set to occupy powerful positions at a crucial moment. In this context, active 
leadership is required not only from the Commission but also from the other Member 
States.  
Finally, it is important to stress that the EU is still in the process of adjusting to the 
new realities of international climate diplomacy and US foreign policy more generally. 
This paper has provided an insight into the early stages of this adaptation process. As 
a result, its main limitation is that its findings remain preliminary.  
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